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Promises to Keep: Ensuring the Payment of 
Americans’ Pension Benefits in the Wake of the Great 
Recession 
Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt, JD, PhD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic decline of the stock market from October 2007 to February 
2009 greatly exacerbated our nation’s pension funding problems.  In 2008 
alone, private sector pensions lost over $1 trillion in asset value and public 
sector plans lost another $1 trillion in asset value.1  Although the stock market 
has since recovered, plan administrators have essentially spent the last four 
years digging out of the hole dug during the Great Recession, rather than 
increasing total plan asset value.2  At the same time, the Great Recession has 
sapped corporate and government revenues, decreasing their ability and 
willingness to make pension contributions that have already been promised.3  
Even before the Great Recession, vast changes were afoot in the American 
pension system.  Since at least 1980, American workers have suffered 
 
          *  Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law, Indiana University – 
Bloomington, School of Law.  I would like to thank Professor Amy Westbrook and the members of the 
Washburn Law Journal for inviting me to participate in the symposium on labor and employment law.  It was 
a wonderful and stimulating experience.  I would also like to thank the editors of the Journal for their 
patience and work on this Article.  I have become demanding in my advancing age.  Finally, I would like to 
thank Ryan McDonald, Clement Warr, and Michael Caine for their diligent research assistance on this 
project.  Without their efforts, it would be a much-diminished piece. 
 1. Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential Impact on 
the Retirement Incomes of Baby Boomers, SOC. SEC. BULL., Oct. 2009, at 3; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, 
THE WIDENING GAP: THE GREAT RECESSION’S IMPACT ON STATE PENSION AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE 
COSTS 2 (April 2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
State_policy/State_Pensions_Health_Care_Retiree_Benefits.pdf. 
 2. Charles Blahous, The Private-Sector Pension Predicament, POL’Y REV. 15, Dec. 2011–Jan. 2012, 
at 17–18; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE WIDENING GAP UPDATE at 2 (June 2012), available at http://
www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Pensions_Update.pdf. 
 3. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 2, at 4.  At its height, the Great Recession decreased 
federal revenue by about $400 billion per year and state revenue by about $253 billion per year.  Kenneth G. 
Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfall, the 2010 Elections and 
the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407 
(2012); ELIZABETH MCNICHOL ET AL., STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT (Ctr. on Budget and 
Policy Priorities ed., June 27, 2012); KATHY RUFFING & JAMES R. HORNEY, ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND 
BUSH POLICIES CONTINUE TO DRIVE LARGE PROJECTED DEFICITS: ECONOMIC RECOVERY MEASURES, 
FINANCIAL RESCUES HAVE ONLY TEMPORARY IMPACT (Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities ed., May 10, 
2011). 
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tremendous downward pressure on wages and benefits as they sought to 
compete with low-wage foreign labor in the new global economy.4  The result 
has been that since that time an ever-smaller percentage of American workers 
enjoy ever-smaller pension benefits.5  Moreover, accompanying these 
changes, American employers have been terminating the traditional defined 
benefit pension plans of the post-World War II era, in favor of the more 
portable defined contribution plans that leave investment and annuity 
decisions and risk with individual workers.6  In a perfect storm, these 
problems and changes occur just as record numbers of baby boomers reach 
retirement age,7 raising the larger question of whether Americans are 
adequately saving for their retirements. 
In this Article, I examine the problem of designing a pension plan within 
the context of our larger public policy of encouraging workers to save for 
retirement.  I discuss the various problems and risks inherent in encouraging 
workers to adequately save for retirement, invest those assets efficiently, and 
ensure the planned level of retirement consumption for the remainder of their 
lives.  I also discuss the three major types of pension plans in the American 
retirement system—defined benefit, defined contribution, and hybrid—and 
assess how well each of these types of plans deals with the problems 
encountered in designing a pension plan.  I then examine the particular 
problems that have arisen because of our relatively recent transition from 
defined benefit to defined contribution plans and the funding problems caused 
by the Great Recession.  I close with a section discussing policy changes that 
might be made to improve our pension system and to help ensure that workers 
receive not only the pension benefits they were promised, but also adequate 
benefits to sustain them comfortably during their retirement. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF SAVING FOR RETIREMENT 
Under the neo-classical economic model, there should be no problem in 
people saving for retirement.  Individual workers should freely choose to save 
“enough,” rationally balancing the benefits of current and future consumption 
with the knowledge to invest in perfect capital and annuity markets.  These 
workers can then retire at their desired age with adequate assets to ensure 
 
 4. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implications for 
Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2001). 
 5. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary 
Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 324, 325 (2007). 
 6. Emps. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 
2010 Form 5500 Annual Reports (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/
2010pensionplanbulletin.PDF. 
 7. Tom Sightings, How Baby Boomers Will Change the Economy, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 
Jan. 15, 2013, http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/On-Retirement/2013/01/15/how-baby-boomers-will-
change-the-economy. 
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sufficient income to maintain their chosen level of post-retirement 
consumption for the remainder of their life.8  Unfortunately, reality bears a 
poor resemblance to theory in this case.  By any objective measure, workers 
seem very myopic in their decisions as to how much to save for retirement, 
valuing current consumption and the crush of current needs over saving for 
retirement.9  It has been estimated that, even with Social Security, most 
people need to save about 9–11% of income in order to achieve post-
retirement income equal to 66–75% of their pre-retirement income.10  In the 
United States, the average contribution in a defined contribution pension plan 
is only around 5%.11  Moreover, in 2010 only 28% of American families 
owned an Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”) or a Keogh plan, and the 
median balance was a mere $40,000.12  This problem has probably been made 
worse by the continual downward pressure on working peoples’ wages and 
benefits, and their disappointment over the decline in their standard of living, 
since the rise of the global labor market in the 1980s.  Left to their own 
devices, most people tend to under-save for retirement, leaving them working 
longer and consuming less in their old age than they would like, or that is 
healthy in some cases.13  In a society that will not just leave its aged to the 
ravages of poverty and which would sometimes like the old to move on and 
leave job openings for the young, this is a problem not only for the affected 
individuals, but also for society. 
Federal law establishes a three-pronged strategy to ensure retirement 
income and encourage saving for retirement.  The first is the Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance (“OASI”) provision of our Social Security system, which 
requires that each individual who qualifies by making certain wage tax 
 
 8. SONDRA BEVERLY ET AL., DETERMINANTS OF ASSET BUILDING 89–152 (Urban Inst. Press 2008). 
 9. HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 141–42 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Press 2000). 
A devout neo-classicist might argue that individual saving still works; it’s just that people put a very 
high value on current consumption over future retirement income.  Although this is theoretically possible, the 
extremely low levels of individual savings for retirement⎯even in the face of tax subsidy⎯and the amount 
of hand-wringing and seemingly genuine regret commonly expressed about retirement savings would seem to 
suggest that people really do have a problem with being adequately disciplined about retirement saving.  
Besides, imagined perverse personal preferences can theoretically be used to explain any bizarre behavior as 
rational.  As one of my graduate school professors explained, if a devout neo-classicist saw someone drink a 
case of motor oil and die, the neo-classicist might conclude “they must really like the taste of motor oil. 
 10. JOHN BROADBENT ET AL., THE SHIFT FROM DEFINED BENEFIT TO DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION 
PLANS—IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSET ALLOCATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 30–31 (Working Grp., Comm. on 
the Global Fin. Sys. 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/wgpapers/cgfs27broadbent3.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 30. 
 12. Craig Copeland, Individual Account Retirement Plans: An Analysis of the 2010 Survey of 
Consumer Finances, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF, Sept. 2012 (No. 375), at 1, available at http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2012_No375_IndvAccts.pdf. 
 13. The most common reason given for this “myopia” in retirement savings is “hyperbolic discounting” 
or “too high of discounting” of the value of future consumption in deciding whether to consume or save.  
Amy B. Monahan, Redistributing Health and Retirement Risks, 89 CHI. KENT L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 
2014) (preliminary draft presented by Professor Monahan at the 35th Annual Piper Lecture at the Chicago-
Kent College of Law on March 12, 2013). 
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payments into the system receives an old-age benefit to provide a minimum 
retirement benefit—for themselves and any survivors.14  In 2012, the OASDI 
program paid an average monthly benefit of $2,051 to a retired worker and 
spouse,15 which on average replaced approximately 17% of the retiree’s pre-
retirement income.16  Despite the abuse it commonly receives from the press, 
with current assets sufficient to pay out full benefits until 2033 and 75% of 
benefits indefinitely after that,17 Social Security actually looks pretty good 
compared with the financing of our other means of providing for retirement 
income. 
The second prong of federal policy is to encourage retirement saving 
through IRAs or Keogh Plans.18  The amount of tax benefit to individuals in 
2012, given in the form of tax deferral in order to encourage investment in 
IRAs and Keogh plans, has been estimated at $36.1 billion.19  As shown in 
Figure 1, in 2011, Americans held some $4.9 trillion in IRAs and Keogh 
accounts.  Although this is an impressive total, because most individual 
accounts are so small, individual saving by itself has not seemed equal to the 
task of promoting adequate individual saving for retirement.  Recently there 
have been proposals to increase individual saving for retirement by instituting 
“Automatic IRA’s,” in which 3% of an employee’s salary is automatically 
saved into an IRA, unless the employee affirmatively opts out.20  Although 
the Chamber of Commerce has successfully opposed such legislation at the 
 
 14. See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006). 
 15. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2013 SOCIAL SECURITY/SSI/MEDICARE INFORMATION, http://www.ssa.gov/
legislation/2013factsheet.pdf (last visited May 14, 2013).  Although there is no minimum benefit, the 
maximum social security benefit in 2012 was $2,513 a month for a worker who retires at age 66.  Soc. Sec. 
Admin., Maximum Social Security Retirement Benefit (May 2, 2013), http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/
answers/detail/a_id/5/kw/maximum%20Social%20Security%20retirement%20benefits%202012. 
 16. Patrick J. Purcull, Income Replacement Ratios in the Health and Retirement Study, SOC. SEC. 
BULL., Aug 2012, at 45, available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n3/v72n3p37.html.  Because 
social security has a maximum benefit, it replaces a higher percentage of income for low income workers and 
a lower percentage of income for higher income workers who reach the maximum benefit.  Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide, Workforce Management and Retirement in a 401(k) World, TOWERS WATSON (Sept. 2007), http:/
/www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.asp?ArticleID=17782. 
 17. BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND 
FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. DOC. NO. 112-102, at 11 (2012), available at http://
www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2012/tr2012.pdf; see also, Matt Bruenig, The Myth of Social Security Insolvency, 
MATTBRUENIG: POLITICS (Aug. 16, 2011), http://mattbruenig.com/2011/08/16/the-myth-of-social-security-
insolvency/; Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security in an Era of Retrenchment: What Would Happen if the Social 
Security Trust Funds Were Exhausted?, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 43 (2012). 
 18. Individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) allow a person to set aside and invest a contribution each 
year in an individual account.  There are several types of IRAs, and in recent years Congress has expanded 
them for nonretirement purposes (such as education).  26 U.S.C. § 408.  Keogh plans are tax-deferred 
retirement accounts for self-employed workers or persons employed by unincorporated businesses.  Id. 
§ 401(a), (d). 
 19. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010–2014 at 49 (Comm. Print 2010), available at https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3718. 
 20. Press Release, Representative Neal Introduces Automatic IRA Act of 2010, http://neal.house.gov/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27:rep-neal-introduces-automatic-ira-bill&catid=1:press-
releases&Itemid=8 (last visited May 14, 2013). 
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federal level, California adopted such a scheme in 2012 for implementation in 
2013.21 
Finally, the third prong of federal policy is to encourage employers to 
offer their employees pension plans that effectively set aside a portion of the 
employees’ current compensation for future retirement consumption.  The 
amount of tax benefit to individuals and corporations in 2012, given in the 
form of tax deferral in order to encourage the formation of pension plans, has 
been estimated at about $106.1 billion.22  As shown in Figure 1, in 2011, 
private pension plans held over $7.2 trillion in assets and government pension 
plans held around $4.5 trillion in assets.  In the halcyon days of American 
manufacturing after World War II, large American employers embraced 
pension plans as a way to bind high-skill workers to the employer.23  With the 
rise of the new economic age of trade and information technology in the late 
1970s and the continuing decline of American unions, American employers 
have been much less enthusiastic about offering pension plans in their effort 
to compete with low-wage foreign labor.24  Since 2000, the percent of full-
time American private-sector workers covered by some form of pension plan 
has decreased from 59.8% to 53.7%.25  Although it is more difficult to 
consistently measure, it also seems that employer contributions to pensions 
have been declining since around 1980.  In perhaps the best empirical study 
on the subject, Teresa Ghilarducci and Wei Sun found that between 1981 and 
1998 the average employer pension contribution declined from $2,140 to 
$1,404 per employee—a decrease of 34.4% in just 17 years.26  I now turn to 
the problems and efficacy of this third prong of our system for providing for 
retirement. 
 
 21. Ina Jaffe, Automatic-Enrollment IRAs Get a Test Run in California, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, May 01, 
2013 (3:16 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/01/179823303/automatic-enrollment-iras-get-a-test-run-in-
california. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Cf. Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 5, at 323. 
 24. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4, at 8. 
 25. Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and 
Trends, 2011, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF, Nov. 2012, (No. 378), at 29 Figure 20, http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_11-2012_No378_RetParticip.pdf. 
 26. See generally Teresa Ghilarducci & Wei Sun, How Defined Contribution Plans and 401(K)s Affect 
Employer Pension Costs, 5 J. OF PENSION ECON. & FIN. 175 (2006). 
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Figure 1:  United States Total Retirement Assets, by Type of Assets, 
Trillions of Dollars, Selected Years 
 
Sources: ITULIP.COM (Dec. 23, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.itulip.com/forums/showthread.php/21310-
National-Retirement-Assets (compiling data from Investment Company Institute, Federal Reserve Board, 
National Association of Government Defined Contribution Administrators, American Council of Life 
Insurers, and Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Division). 
*Note 2011 Figures are for end of the second quarter. 
III.  THE AMERICAN PENSION SYSTEM 
A.  The Problems of Designing a Pension Plan 
In designing a pension plan, there are three basic problems: (1) setting 
aside enough money during employment, (2) investing that money efficiently 
and wisely, and (3) ensuring that the pensioner can achieve the planned level 
of post-retirement consumption for the rest of his life.  Attendant to these 
problems, there are at least eight distinct issues or risks that must be 
navigated. 
The problem of setting aside enough money during employment raises 
the issue of adequate discipline in the deferral of income, as well as the issues 
of accrual risk and solvency risk.  As previously mentioned, most workers are 
myopic in their individual decisions concerning how much to save for 
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retirement.27  People seem to do better with these decisions on a group basis 
with pension plans, especially if a union represents the workers.  But there is 
no guarantee that just because a worker has a pension plan that the plan has 
committed enough current resources to adequately support the employees in 
retirement.  As with individual saving, what is an adequate deferral of present 
consumption to retirement consumption is somewhat subjective,28 but one can 
at least observe which type of pension plans seems to provide greater 
retirement resources. 
“Accrual risk” is the risk that the worker will not gain enough credit for 
work done under the pension system to be eligible for pension benefits or to 
get the full benefit of the work he has performed.29  The “portability” of 
employee pension benefits as the employees move from one job to another 
has become a greater concern as American employers have come to organize 
production around “flexible labor” with shorter job tenure and a more mobile 
work force.30  “Solvency risk” is the risk that employers will fail to actually 
set aside enough money now to adequately fund the promised benefits later.31  
There is a natural tendency on the part of employers to promise future 
benefits—thus inducing current labor—but then fail to make the necessary 
present commitment of money, leaving the future liability to be borne by 
future owners, future taxpayers, or the workers themselves after insolvency.  
This tendency occurs because of the “moral hazard” problem inherent in the 
promise by the employer to pay future benefits to the employees long after the 
employees perform the work the employer wants done.32 
The problem of investing the plan’s assets efficiently and wisely raises 
the issue of management costs and the question of who bears the investment 
risk.  There are, of course, costs in managing investment funds over time.  
There are investments to be assessed, and the plan’s assets have to be 
regularly balanced not only with an eye toward maximizing expected return 
but also in spreading risk and investing in more secure investments as the plan 
participants age.  With respect to minimizing investment management costs, 
there are undoubtedly economies of scale to be achieved by employing 
 
 27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 28. One rule of thumb suggests that people should save eight times their last year’s income by 
retirement at age 65.  For a person making $80,000 a year, eight times that amount—or $640,000—along 
with social security benefits, would provide a retirement income of about 85% of the pre-retirement income.  
Chris Taylor, Are We Saving Enough to Retire? No (But We Think We Are), REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2012), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/21/us-column-save-retirement-idUSBRE88K0NB20120921. 
 29. BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. 
 30. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 31. Cf. Blahous, supra note 2, at 22. 
 32. Id. 
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professional firm managers to invest the plan assets for multiple participants 
on a group basis.33 
“Investment risk” is the risk that, despite appropriate management, the 
plan’s investments under- or over-perform relative to the rate of return that 
was assumed in setting aside funds to pay for future benefits.34  A plan might 
specify a minimum schedule of benefits for the employees, in which case the 
risk that the plan’s investments might under- or over-perform would fall on 
the employer, who would have to make up for any fund deficit or get to 
reduce future fund contributions because of a fund surplus.  Alternatively, the 
plan might specify that the employees’ benefits depend on the performance of 
the plan’s investments; in which case, the risk that the plan’s investments 
under- or over-perform would fall on the employees.  Generally, one would 
expect that the employer would have a superior ability to bear the risk of 
investment, relative to the employees, because the employer can combine the 
pension assets of multiple employees and spread risk over more investments 
and over time.35  As a result, one would expect that there would be potential 
gains from trade between the employer and the employees, in which the 
employer agreed to bear the investment risk in return for a somewhat smaller 
pension benefit.  Public employers in particular would seem to have a superior 
ability to bear risk because the State is a very large employer with pension 
assets for many employees and because of its greater ability to raise revenue 
or borrow when pension investments under-perform.36 
The problem of ensuring that the pension provides adequate benefits to 
achieve the planned level of post-retirement consumption for the rest of the 
pensioners’ lives raises the issues of inflation risk, market-timing risk, and 
longevity risk.  “Inflation risk” is the risk that inflation will outpace the 
expectations of the plan so that, despite a disciplined commitment of present 
resources and sound investment, the benefits produced by the plan do not 
maintain sufficient purchasing power to adequately maintain the employees in 
retirement.37  “Market-timing risk” is the risk that, despite a disciplined 
commitment of present resources and sound investment, the employee reaches 
retirement age at a time when the market is down and thus plan resources are 
 
 33. UTAH EDUC. ASS’N, DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS (DB) VS. DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (DC) at 1, 
http://myuea.org/Uploads/files/Resources/Research/DBvsDCPlan.pdf (last visited May 14, 2013).  Nebraska 
has both defined benefit and defined contribution plans for their state employees and has found that the 
administrative cost of their defined contribution plan is about twice that of their defined benefit plan.  Id. at 4. 
 34. BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 5. 
 35. See Zvi Bodie et al., Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans: What Are the 
Real Trade-offs?, in PENSIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 139, 145 (Zvi Bodie et al. eds., 1988). 
 36. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Mohammad Khan, Undermining or Promoting Democratic 
Government? An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Public Sector Collective Bargaining, NEV. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
 37. See BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 5–6. 
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too low to maintain the planned benefits.38  Inflation risk and market-timing 
risk are probably best borne on a group basis by the employer or a group plan 
because fluctuation in inflation and the market will tend to even out over time.  
As has been evident during the Great Recession, leaving market-timing risk to 
be borne by individuals can have macro-economic implications as individual 
employees postpone retirement during recessions when their retirement assets 
are low, but also at precisely the time we might want older employees to retire 
to make room for new graduates.39 
“Longevity risk” is the risk that the employee will live longer than 
planned and outlive his or her retirement benefits.40  This risk can be 
eliminated by using the pension assets to buy a life annuity upon retirement 
that pays a specified monthly benefit for life.  Due to the adverse selection 
problem that people individually tend to buy annuities only if they expect to 
live longer than average, there is no efficient market for individual 
annuities.41  As a result, only group plans can buy annuities at a competitive 
price and annuitize to an efficient level.42  Group plans can also self-annuitize 
to pay life benefits to the group. 
B.  Types of Pension Plans: Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and 
Hybrid 
Over the years, American employers and unions have developed a 
myriad of pension plans that can generally be placed in one of three 
categories: defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, and hybrid plans.  
These types of plans address the problems of designing a pension plan in 
different ways and have different advantages and disadvantages.  I set forth 
the basic outline of each of these different types of pensions below and then 
turn to the question of how well each addresses the problems of designing a 
pension plan. 
The “defined benefit plan” is the traditional pension plan that dominated 
during the post-war industrial period.43  An example would be the United 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Catherine Rampell & Matthew Saltmarsh, A Reluctance to Retire Means Fewer Openings, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03retire.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0. 
 40. BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 5. 
 41. Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 149. 
 42. See WIS. DEP’T OF ADMIN. ET AL., STUDY OF THE WISCONSIN RETIREMENT SYSTEM: IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 32 at 44 (June 30, 2012), http://etf.wi.gov/publications/wrs-
study.pdf.  A recent study of the Wisconsin state employee pension found that the state pension plan could 
produce a life annuity benefit of $8,172 per year with an investment of $100,000 but that, at current 
individual annuity prices, an individual employee could buy a life annuity benefit of only $6,408 per year 
with an investment of $100,000—a benefit that is 21.6% less.  Id. 
 43. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, 
WORKING GROUP, THE MERITS OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION VS DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS WITH AN EMPHASIS 
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Auto Workers General Motors Pension Plan.  Under such a plan, the 
employer promises to pay a “defined benefit” to the employee for life, after 
retirement at a certain age, according to a formula based on years of service 
and average monthly salary.44 
For example, the plan might specify that, after retirement at age 64, the 
pension plan would pay the employee a monthly benefit for life equal to 
1.8%, times the number of years of service, multiplied by the employee’s 
average monthly salary during the last five years of employment.  The plan is 
funded by employer contributions, or a combination of employer and 
employee contributions, which are then invested and annuitized by the 
pensions plan on a group basis.45  The employer is prohibited by law from 
investing any more than 10% of the plan assets back into its own business.46  
Because the benefit is defined, the employer bears the risk that the plan’s 
investments under- or over-perform to finance the promised benefits and must 
make up any deficit or benefit from any surplus.47  If the employee leaves the 
employer, generally any accrued pension benefits stay with that plan and, 
upon later retirement, the employee would receive a pension benefit according 
to the plan formula. 
The “defined contribution plan” is of more recent origin but has proven 
very popular since the 1980s.48  Examples include the very popular “401(k) 
plans” or, for public employees, the “403(b) plans”—named for the section of 
the Tax Code that governs them.49  Under this type of plan, the employer 
promises to make a “defined contribution” to an individual account for each 
employee with every paycheck.50  Employee contributions are also possible.  
For example, the employer might promise to contribute an amount equal to 
6% of pay, or might promise to match any employee contribution up to 3% of 
pay.  The employee can then decide how to invest these contributions among 
the possibilities allowed by the plan or leave the contributions to be invested 
according to some plan default.  Defined contribution plans usually allow 
investment in the company stock and a selection of equity and bond mutual 
funds.51  If the employee leaves the employer, he or she can “roll over” the 
amount in his or her individual account into either the new employer’s 
 
ON SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS 1 (1997), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/
dbvsdc.htm#purp. 
 44. Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 141. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), § 407(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1107(a)(2) (2006). 
 47. BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. 
 48. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 43. 
 49. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b). 
 50. Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 140. 
 51. Id. 
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defined contribution plan or an IRA.52  Upon retirement, the employee can 
make periodic withdrawals from his or her account to cover living expenses 
or can make a larger lump sum withdrawal to buy an annuity. 
“Hybrid plans” combine aspects of both the defined benefit plan and the 
defined contribution plan.53  Sometimes employers will operate two separate 
plans, one defined benefit and one defined contribution, in order to give their 
employees partial benefits under each type of plan or to transition from a 
defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan.54  A more interesting 
possibility exists, however, where the employer combines aspects of defined 
benefit and defined contribution plans in the same plan. 
An example of this is a “cash balance” plan.55  Under these plans, the 
employer promises to make a defined contribution to each employee’s 
individual account, based on compensation, and then guarantees that the 
account will grow by at least a fixed percentage annually.56  For example, the 
employer might promise to contribute an amount equal to 6% of pay, or might 
promise to match any employee contribution up to 3% of pay, and then 
promise an investment growth rate of at least 3%.  The plan assets are then 
professionally invested on a group basis.  The employer and employee share 
the risk of poor investment performance according to how high the guaranteed 
rate is set.57  If the employee leaves the employer, the assets and accrued 
interest in his account can be rolled over into either the new employer’s 
pension plan or an IRA.  Upon reaching retirement age, a worker can take the 
accrued amount either as a lump sum or an annuity.  Under the pension plan, 
the worker might even be required to take all or a portion of the benefit in an 
annuity that can be administered or purchased by the plan on a group basis.  
Thus, the hybrid cash balance plans attempt to take advantage of the 
professional group investment and annuitization features of the defined 
benefit plan while giving the employer and employee the portability and 
solvency advantages of the defined contribution plan. 
C.  Adequacy of Plans in Minimizing Design Problems and Providing for 
Workers’ Retirement 
So how well do each of these three types of pension plans do at the 
problems of setting aside enough money during employment, efficiently and 
 
 52. 26 U.S.C. § 402(c). 
 53. BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 10. 
 54. See id. 
 55. John J. Lucas, Are Cash Balance Pension Plans a Viable Retirement Program for Corporate 
America?, 10 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 451, 451 (2012). 
 56. BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 10. 
 57. If the employer promises a high guaranteed rate, it will bear the investment risk because it is less 
likely that the plan’s investments will exceed that rate.  However, if the employer sets a low guaranteed rate, 
the employees will bear the risk that the plan’s investments do worse than expected. 
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wisely investing that money, and ensuring that the employees have adequate 
income to achieve the planned post-retirement level of consumption for the 
rest of their lives? 
1.  Setting Aside Enough Money During Employment 
The results are mixed as to how the various types of pension plans 
perform with respect to setting aside enough money during employment.  
Defined benefit and hybrid plans seem to do better with respect to ensuring 
adequate discipline in deferring income, especially if a union is involved, 
although defined contribution and hybrid plans do better on accrual risk 
(portability) and solvency risk.  Defined benefit and hybrid plans generally 
provide for larger contributions during employment and have higher 
participation rates.58  Employee voluntary participation and contribution rates 
under defined contribution plans are discouraging, even with matching 
employer contributions, and 25% of covered employees do not participate at 
all.59 
In a 2005 survey of 32 employers with 401(k) plans, Watson Wyatt 
found that employee participation rates varied from 41% to 92% and their 
contribution rates varied from under 4% to over 15%, with younger- and low-
income workers participating and contributing the least and older, high-
income workers participating and contributing the most.60  In the same 
survey, Watson Wyatt found that, even among covered workers who were 50 
to 60 years old and had more than 20 years of service, 39.6% had 401(k) 
balances that were less than their annual income, 26.2% had 401(k) balances 
that were less than half of their annual income, and 8.8% had balances that 
were equal to zero.61 
Defined contribution plans also suffer from what is referred to as 
“leakage” of retirement assets, as employees withdraw money from their 
IRAs before retirement despite penalty tax rates to discourage such 
 
 58. See Ghilarducci, supra note 26.  Ghilarducci and Sun found that the decrease in the average 
employer pension contribution of 34.4% that they observed between 1981 and 1998 was associated with the 
increase in the percent of pension contributions attributed to defined contribution plans from 23% to 68% 
during that same time period.  Id. at 175; see also David Blake, Does It Matter What Type of Pension Scheme 
You Have?, 110 ECON. J. F46, F49 (2000) (finding that in the UK the average contribution per employee is 
15–18% for defined benefit plans but only 9% for defined contribution plans).  This decrease in the employer 
set-aside under defined contribution pensions is reflected in the lower amount of assets accumulated per 
participant in those pensions.  In 2009, private employer defined benefit plans in the United States had about 
$2.2 trillion in assets and 18.1 million participants, for a total asset set-aside of $121,547 per participant.  In 
that same year, private employer defined contribution plans in the United States had about $4 trillion in assets 
and 72 million participants for a total asset set-aside of $55,556 per participant.  Copeland, supra note 25, at 
7. 
 59. BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 29–30. 
 60. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Workforce Management and Retirement in a 401(k) World, at 3–4, Sept. 
2007, http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.asp?ArticleID=17782. 
 61. Id. at 4. 
DAU-SCHMIDT (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2013  9:46 AM 
2013] Promises to Keep 405 
 
withdrawals.62  This problem of leakage has recently become worse as older 
workers borrow against retirement to cover losses in assets and income during 
the Great Recession.63  However, defined contribution and hybrid plans are 
clearly more portable than defined benefit plans, which suffer from the 
problem of “back-loading” explained below, even with full vesting.64  
Defined contribution and hybrid plans also do better navigating solvency risk 
because their contributions are made contemporaneously with liability.  
Defined benefit plans suffer from a moral hazard problem, as explained 
below, because the employees provide present labor in return for future 
benefits that might not be fully funded.65  Defined contribution plans might 
not commit adequate resources for retirement, but at least they are fully 
funded. 
Traditional defined benefit plans are “back-loaded” in that the cost of the 
benefits to the employer, and the value of the benefits to the employee, 
increase with each year that the employee works for the employer.66  This 
occurs because, under such a plan, each year worked yields the same percent 
of income upon retirement, but the contributions in the early years that are 
necessary to pay for these benefits are lower because they have more years to 
accrue interest before the benefits are paid.  This can be seen in Figure 2 
where I present an example of the employer cost, as a percent of wages, of a 
defined benefit plan that yields pension assets after 30 years of work equal to 
about 4.5 times the employee’s last year’s salary.67  As can be seen in the 
graph, the employer’s contributions under the defined benefit plan start out at 
about 3.5% of wages and grow to almost 14% of wages over the 30 years the 
pension is earned, but each year’s contribution is worth the same at the 
beginning of retirement because the earlier contributions have more years to 
earn interest.68  In order to generate pension assets of a like amount after 30 
 
 62. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDEN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 
142 (The Brookings Inst. ed., 2004).  Although the law allows early withdrawals without penalty for certain 
emergencies, such as healthcare costs or the loss of a job, Munnell and Sunden found that many employees 
withdraw and spend their defined contribution plan savings routinely upon leaving a job, despite a 10% 
penalty tax.  Id. 
 63. Increase in Participants Taking Loans from Their 401(k) Plans, Wells Fargo Finds, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 11, 2013 (9:00 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20130411-907092.html. 
 64. Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 143. 
 65. Blahous, supra note 2, at 22. 
 66. Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 143, 146. 
 67. Figure 2 assumes an employee who begins with a salary of $30,000 a year that grows at 3% a year, 
a relevant interest rate of 8%, a defined benefit formula that specifies the employee will be paid an annual 
benefit equal to 1.67% times years of service (30) times the employee’s average income in the last three years 
of service ($68,658) for the rest of the employee’s life (assumed 20 years), or $318,655 for an employee with 
an initial annual salary of $30,000 that grows 3% a year.  These pension assets are enough to pay an annual 
benefit equal to 50% of the average of the employee’s last three years’ of salary for the remainder of the 
employee’s 20-year life expectancy.  
 68. Again, I assume an 8% interest rate. 
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years of work with a defined contribution or cash balance plan, the employer 
only has to set aside a constant 6.44% of wages. 
The problem with back-loading in defined benefit plans is that, because 
the employer’s pension costs increase as the employee ages, the employer has 
incentive to get rid of older employees or close plants with an aging 
workforce, just to save on pension costs.69  Additionally, because the value of 
the pension contribution to the employee also rises as the employee ages 
under defined benefit plans, if the employee is laid off or leaves the employer 
early in his or her career, the employee misses out on the most valuable years 
of accrual in the plan.70 
 
Figure 2: Employer Pension Cost as a Percent of Wages 
Over 30 Years of Work 
 
Figure 2 assumptions: (1) Employee annual salary starts at $30,000 and grows 3% each year; (2) Interest rate 
for pension assets is 8% per year; (3) Pension value in year 30 is $319,000 (enough to pay 50% of average of 
last three years of earnings for 20 years). 
 
Unlike defined contribution and cash balance plans, traditional defined 
benefit plans also suffer from a “moral hazard problem.”71  This moral hazard 
problem arises because of the lag in time between when the pension benefits 
are promised for work done and the time when these benefits have to be paid.  
In both the private and public sector, it is very easy for employers to promise 
employees future pension benefits now but leave the problem of how to pay 
 
 69. Gary Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The 1990’s Version of Age and Pension 
Discrimination in Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 511–12 (1997). 
 70. Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 146. 
 71. Blahous, supra note 2, at 22. 
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for them to future owners or taxpayers, with the possibility of default to the 
detriment of the employees.  Defined contribution and cash balance plans do 
not suffer from this problem because the employer covers his or her pension 
liability at the time the work is done and the liability is incurred. 
In the private sector, Congress enacted the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”)72 in order to mediate this problem with 
defined benefit plans and ensure that the necessary payments were made.73  
ERISA requires that employers with defined benefit plans make timely 
contributions that meet certain minimum funding requirements and insure 
their pension liability through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation.74  
As discussed later, although ERISA has significantly improved pension 
funding in the private sector, the stock market decline of the Great Recession 
has left private defined benefit plans with an average asset to liability funding 
ratio of 79% in 2011.75 
Public sector pensions are not subject to the ERISA funding 
requirements and, although many states have done well policing their own 
funding of pensions, others have not fared so well.76  Since 1983, the Illinois 
state pension plans have developed a collective unfunded liability of $79.5 
billion for an asset-to-liability ratio of 54%.77  There have been a variety of 
reasons for the growth of this unfunded liability since 1983, including lower 
investment returns due to the Great Recession.  However, the largest cause of 
the unfunded liability by far, accounting for almost 43%, has been that the 
State of Illinois has simply failed to make the payments to the pension plans 
that it has promised, leaving this liability to the employees or future 
taxpayers.78 
 
 72. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). 
 73. See James P. Allen, Jr. & Richard A. Bales, ERISA Failure and the Erosion of Workers’ Rights: 
The Urgent Need to Protect Private & Public Workers’ Pensions and Benefits, 75 ALBANY L. REV. 449, at 
456, 460 (2011); President Gerald R. Ford, Statement Upon Signing the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, available at http://www. 
pbgc.gov/about/who-we-are/pg/president-ford-signing-erisa-of-1974.html (delivered Sept. 2, 1974). 
 74. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a); see also Allen, supra note 73, at 462. 
 75. John Ehrhardt et al., De-Risking Efforts by Plan Sponsors Reduce Pension Obligations, But 
Continued Discount Rate Declines Produce Record-High Pension Plan Deficits in 2012, MILLIMAN (2012), 
http://www.milliman.com/expertise/employee-benefits/products-tools/pension-funding-study/. 
 76. As recently as 2001, public pension plans enjoyed an average asset-to-liability ratio of 103%.  Even 
in the wake of the Great Recession, a few jurisdictions such as the District of Columbia and Wisconsin have 
maintained 100% funding and about a third have asset to liability ratios in excess of the 80% recommended 
for a “well-funded pension” by the Government Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”).  ALICIA H. 
MUNNELL ET AL., THE FUNDING OF STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: 2011-2015 at 4 (Ctr. for Ret. Res. at Bos. 
Coll. Report ed., May 2012), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/slp_24.pdf. 
 77. See MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 76, at 3. 
 78. Eric M. Madiar et al., Thoughts on Illinois’ Public Pension Crisis, 28th Annual Illinois Public 
Sector Labor Relations Law Conference, Chicago-Kent College of Law (Nov. 30, 2012) (copy on file with 
the author). 
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Figure 3: Illinois State Pensions—Percent of the Current $79.5 Billion 
Unfunded Liability Attributable to the Stated Cause, FY 1983-2011. 
 
Source: Eric M. Madiar, et al., Thoughts on Illinois’ Public Pension Crisis, 28th Annual Illinois Public Sector 
Labor Relations Law Conference, Chicago-Kent College of Law (Nov. 30, 2012). 
 
2.  Investing That Money Efficiently and Wisely 
The results are also mixed as to how the various types of pension plans 
deal with the problem of investing plan assets efficiently and wisely.  Defined 
contribution plans have lower compliance costs than hybrid or defined benefit 
plans, and this is often cited as a reason behind employers’ recent move to 
defined contribution plans.79  However, defined contribution plans have lower 
compliance costs because they do not have the long-term funding, group 
investment, and annuitization features regulated by ERISA.  These are 
features that we may, from a societal perspective, decide are well worth the 
additional expense. 
There is good evidence that the professionally managed investment of 
pension assets on a group basis, as is done in defined benefit and cash balance 
plans, is much more efficient than the many individual investment decisions 
of individual workers required by defined contribution plans.80  In a series of 
studies comparing the investment returns of defined benefit and defined 
 
 79. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 43. 
 80. BETH ALMEIDA & WILLIAM B. FORNIA, A BETTER BANG FOR THE BUCK: THE ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCIES OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS 4 (Nat’l Inst. on Ret. Sec. ed., 2008), available at http://
ucrpfuture.universityofcalifornia.edu/files/2010/08/peb_ax_k-4_overview-discussion-db-dc-plans.pdf; see 
generally WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, PENSION ASPIRATIONS AND REALIZATIONS: A PERSPECTIVE ON 
YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW, Mar. 2007. 
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contribution plans from 1999–2009, Towers Watson found that the 
professional investors of defined benefit plans out-performed individual 
investing under defined contribution plans by 1–2.7% per year; this is no 
small accomplishment given that pension plans typically plan on total 
earnings of 6–8% per year.81 
The investment of plan assets on a group basis also achieves economies 
of scale in the collection and evaluation of investment information.82  Beth 
Almeida and William B. Fornia estimate that defined benefit plans enjoy a 
cost savings of 26% over defined contribution plans because of more efficient 
and superior investment decisions.83  Hybrid plans that undertake asset 
investment on a group basis also achieve these costs savings.  Defined benefit 
and hybrid plans that undertake the professional group investment of plan 
assets also do a better job of spreading risk and balancing their investment 
portfolios over time than traditional defined contribution plans.84  Prudent 
investment requires that, as plan participants age, plan assets be re-balanced 
toward less risky investments.  Group plans age less, relative to a single 
individual, so they need less rebalancing.  Besides, experience shows that 
professional investors are better at managing age rebalancing decisions.  
Almeida and Fornia estimate that defined benefit plans enjoy a cost savings of 
5% over defined contribution plans because of superior portfolio balance over 
time.85 
3.  Ensuring that the Beneficiaries Achieve the Planned Level of Retirement 
Consumption for the Rest of Their Lives 
Defined benefit and hybrid plans definitely do better than defined 
contribution plans at ensuring that plan beneficiaries enjoy the planned level 
of post-retirement consumption for the rest of their lives.  Defined benefit 
plans contain a modest level of protection from inflation because the pension 
benefits depend on the last several years of employee earnings and wages tend 
 
 81. Vishal Apte & Brendan McFarland, DB Versus DC Investment Returns: The 2008-2009 Update, 
TOWERS WATSON (Mar. 2011), http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/insider/
2011/DB-Versus-DC-Plan-Investment-Returns-The-2008-2009-Update; see also Stephen P. McCourt, 
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans: A History, Market Overview and Comparative Analysis, 43 
BENEFITS & COMPENSATION DIG. 1, Feb. 2006, at 4–5, http://www.ifebp.org/PDF/webexclusive/06feb.pdf. 
 82. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL & MAURICIO SOTO, STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS ARE DIFFERENT 
FROM PRIVATE PLANS 5 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll. ed., 2007).  Munnell and Soto found that asset 
management fees for defined contribution plans ranged from 60 to 170 basis points, while asset management 
fees for defined contribution plans averaged a mere 25 basis points.  Id. 
 83. Almeida et al., supra note 80, at 12–14.  According to a recent Watson Wyatt study, defined benefit 
plans outperformed defined contribution plans in asset investment earnings by an average of one percentage 
point (i.e., 100 basis points) annually between 1995 and 2008.  Given an approximately 5.5% average rate of 
return during this period, the professional investors of the group investment defined benefit plans earned 
about 18% more in investment return than individual investors in defined contribution plans.  WATSON 
WYATT, DEFINED BENEFIT VS. 401(K) INVESTMENT RETURNS: THE 2006–2008 UPDATE 1 (2009). 
 84. See Almeida et al., supra note 80, at 12–14. 
 85. Id. at 14. 
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to track inflation.86  As a result, in the defined benefit plan, inflation risk is 
borne by both the employer and the employee.  Although the earnings on plan 
assets will also increase with inflation, in a defined contribution plan all of the 
inflation risk is borne by the employee.  As previously discussed, there is 
good reason to believe large employers, and especially the State, would be 
superior risk bearers to individual employees.87 
The group investment programs of defined benefit and cash balance 
plans also do better with respect to timing risk than defined contribution 
plans.  As we have witnessed with the recent fluctuations in the stock market, 
workers with defined contribution plans who retired during the boom days of 
the 1990s retired early with much more wealth than they had anticipated, 
while workers with defined contribution plans who had planned to retire in 
2009 found themselves lacking in resources and postponing retirement.88  The 
group investment programs of defined benefit and cash balance plans can 
spread timing risk across many individuals and smooth out these fluctuations, 
making retirement time and income much more predictable. 
Finally, the group annuity aspect of defined benefit and hybrid plans is 
much more efficient at dealing with longevity risk than dealing with this 
problem individually through a defined contribution pension.89  Because they 
annuitize longevity risk across many people, defined benefit and hybrid plans 
do not need to marshal as many resources to cover the risk because assets 
saved for participants who die early can be used to maintain the participants 
who live longer than average.  Individual participants in a defined 
contribution plan cannot deal with this problem as efficiently because they do 
not know whether they will be short-lived or long-lived, and thus they have to 
“over-save” in order to ensure that they have adequate resources for the 
duration of their retirement.  Almeida and Fornia estimate that defined benefit 
plans enjoy a cost savings of 15% over defined contribution plans because of 
their superior longevity risk pooling.90 
Almeida and Fornia present a useful example of the “over-saving” 
problem of defined contribution pensions.91  Consider the problem of dealing 
with the longevity risk of 1,000 female teachers with a retirement age of 62.  
 
 86. See Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 141. 
 87. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 88. James Haggerty, The Financial Disaster Meant Postponing Retirement, THE TIMES TRIB., Mar. 17, 
2013, http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/business/financial-disaster-meant-postponing-retirement-1.1458412.  
But see  Courtney Coile & Phillip Levine, Bulls, Bears, and Retirement Decisions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. 
RESEARCH, Apr. 13, 2013, http://www.nber.org/digest/apr05/w10779.html. 
 89. Defined benefit pension plans solve this problem by compelling annuitization across all participants 
without an opportunity for adverse selection.  In this way, they create “securities” currently unavailable to 
individuals in the market.  Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 145. 
 90. Almeida et al., supra note 80, at 12–14.  However, because men predictably live shorter lives than 
women, on average, and men and women receive the same life benefits under defined benefit plans, men are 
systematically discriminated against and paid less under defined benefit plans.  Cf. id. 
 91. Id. at 6–9. 
DAU-SCHMIDT (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2013  9:46 AM 
2013] Promises to Keep 411 
 
Actuarially, half of the teachers will live to age 85, 10% will live to age 97, 
and one will live to age 110.  A defined benefit plan can provide a $2,224 
monthly benefit for life for each teacher by saving up $355,000 per teacher by 
age 62 and using the assets saved for those who die early to pay benefits to 
those who live longer.  Under a defined contribution plan, each teacher would 
have to save up $455,000 in order to support a $2,224 monthly income—just 
up to age 97.  Those who died before age 97 would leave an estate to their 
heirs, but those who lived longer would end up dependent on either their 
children or the State.  The teachers in the defined contribution plan would 
have to save 28% more, and even then 10% of them would out-live their 
pension.92 
This problem with defined contribution plans could be solved if retirees 
could buy annuities individually in a perfectly competitive market and were 
disciplined enough to do so; however, as previously discussed, adverse 
selection prevents defined contribution participants from being able to buy 
annuities efficiently on an individual basis.93  The people who do buy 
annuities individually tend to be those who have reason to believe they will 
live a long time, driving up the cost of individual annuities above the efficient 
level.  As a result, on an individual basis, people buy too few annuities 
because the cost is inefficiently high.  It is true that, in the teacher example, 
the teachers covered by the defined contribution plan who die before age 97 
will leave their heirs an estate, but the purpose of our pension system tax 
deferral benefit is to encourage saving for retirement, not the amassing of 
estates.  Finally, in deciding how much and whether to annuitize, people 
individually seem to suffer from the same myopia they do in deciding how 
much to save for retirement, evincing an irrational preference for lump sum 
cash disbursements over annuities.94  From the larger societal perspective of 
promoting secure retirement income, we want to encourage more group 
annuitization. 
4.  Which Type of Plan is “Best”: A Summary of the Advantages and 
Disadvantages of the Different Types of Pension Plans 
As we have seen, neither the defined benefit pension plan, nor the 
defined contribution plan, is strictly superior to the other—both have 
advantages and disadvantages.  The major advantages of the defined benefit 
plan are its much greater efficiency in asset investment and annuitization, and 
its more efficient placement of risk on the employer.  The group character of 
the defined benefit plan allows fund managers to take advantage of 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 148. 
 94. See id. 
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professional fund management and economies of scale in making 
investments.  It also allows them to efficiently spread risk across workers and 
over time and efficiently annuitize longevity risk so as to provide the 
maximum retirement income for the amount of assets saved.  Almeida and 
Fornia estimate the cost savings that group investment and annuitization 
afford defined benefit plans over defined contribution plans, producing 
similar benefits, at 46%.95 
A 1998 study conducted for the State of Nebraska comparing the 
performance of its dueling state employee defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans found that, for the same cost, the state’s defined benefit 
plan yielded employee benefits that were 50% higher than those typically 
enjoyed under the defined compensation plan.96  Similarly, a 2011 study by 
the State of Wisconsin found that converting the State’s defined benefit plan 
to a defined contribution plan would raise administrative costs, decrease 
employee benefits, and put more risk on individual employees.97  Defined 
benefit plans also put the risk of investment on the employer who, at least in 
the case of large employers and the government, is undoubtedly a superior 
risk-bearer to that of the individual employee.98  Thus, unlike defined 
contribution plans that put the risk of investment on the individual employee, 
defined benefit plans take advantage of the possibility for efficient trade 
between the employer and employee by having the employer bear the 
investment risk in return for the employee receiving a smaller—but more 
predictable—pension benefit. 
The major advantages of the defined contribution plan are its superior 
treatment of accrual risk and solvency risk.  The current individual account 
characteristic of the defined contribution plans gives each employee a defined 
individual stake that can be taken with them as they transfer from employer to 
employer, or which can stay with the same investment fund as different 
employers make contributions.  Modern mobile employees clearly like the 
individual ownership of an account that is portable and stays with them 
 
 95. Almeida et al., supra note 80, at 6. 
 96. The study, done by Buck Consultants, found that ten years after retirement, a retiree with 30 years 
of service and an average annual salary of $30,000 received on average about $11,230 annually from the 
state’s defined contribution plan, but a participant with similar pay and service credit received $16,797 
annually under the State’s defined benefit plan.  See Jeff D. Opdyke, State Workers’ Pension Plans Spark 
Debate, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2000, at C1.  
 97. WIS. DEP’T OF ADMIN. ET AL., supra note 42, at 9–10.  This study was undertaken pursuant to 
legislation favored by Governor Scott Walker, who advocated conversion to a defined contribution plan.  The 
study was sufficiently negative about such a transition that even Governor Walker has shelved the idea.  
Patrick Marley & Jason Stein, Walker Plans No Changes to State Retirement System, MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. 
SENTINEL, July 2, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/walker-plans-no-changes-to-state-
retirement-system-hh5vq2r-161074435.html; see also EXPERT COMM’N ON PENSIONS, A FINE BALANCE: 
SAFE PENSIONS, AFFORDABLE PLANS, FAIR RULES (2008), available at http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/
consultations/pension/report/Pensions_Report_Eng_web.pdf; Paul M. Secunda, Lessons from the Ontario 
Expert Commission on Pensions for U.S. Policymakers, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87 (2012). 
 98. See Bodie et al., supra note 35, at 145. 
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regardless of changes in employment.  The defined contribution plans also 
avoid the back-loading problem of defined benefit plans.  As previously 
discussed, the back-loading problem gives employers incentive to 
discriminate against older employees and heightens accrual risk because 
employees who are laid off or leave their job later in their career lose out on 
the most valuable years in the accrual of their pension plan.  The current 
individual account characteristic of the defined contribution plan also 
effectively mediates the moral hazard problem of solvency risk because the 
employer’s contributions are required to be made contemporaneously with the 
work done rather than postponed to a later date.  The funding and insurance 
requirements of ERISA have lessened, but not completely solved, the 
solvency problem of private defined benefit plans. 
The best choice that emerges from our discussion is the hybrid cash 
balance plan because it combines the group investment and annuity aspects of 
the defined benefit plan with the current individual account aspect of the 
defined contribution plan.99  The cash balance plans can efficiently invest 
money and spread risk across groups of employees and over time, while also 
giving the employee current employer contributions to an individual account 
that can be transferred from employer to employer or used by multiple 
employers. 
Moreover, the terms of the cash balance plan can be adjusted to select 
any level of risk sharing between the employer and employee desired by the 
parties and to allow the parties to take advantage of the benefits of group 
annuitization.  If the employer is a large employer and can efficiently bear 
investment risk, then it can set the guaranteed rate of return high so that it 
bears the investment risk.  If the employer is a small employer who cannot 
efficiently bear investment risk, then it can set the guaranteed rate of return 
low so that the employees bear the investment risk.  The cash balance plan 
can also specify that some percent of assets are committed to an annuity upon 
retirement.  Assets that are pre-committed across a broad array of employees 
will get the benefit of group annuitization, while those assets left for possible 
lump sum distribution can be used to meet individual preferences for 
investment, consumption, and bequeathment.  The only way in which defined 
benefit plans are superior to cash balance plans is in dealing with inflation 
risk, but even that could be solved through the use of inflation-protected 
group annuities.  The only way in which defined contribution plans are 
superior to cash balance plans is in compliance costs, but cash balance plans 
enjoy economies in other management costs, and the low compliance costs of 
 
 99. Zaki M. Khorasanee, Risk-Sharing and Benefit Smoothing in a Hybrid Pension Plan, 16 N. AM. 
ACTUARIAL J. 449, 449 (2012). 
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defined contribution plans come at the expense of providing an insecure 
pension product to plan participants. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Which Pension Plan Type Enjoys Advantages in 
Dealing With Various Risks (A = Advantage) 
 Defined 
Benefit 
Defined 
Contribution 
Hybrid (Cash 
Balance) 
I.   Saving Enough 
Money 
 A A 
Deferral Discipline A  A 
Accrual Risk  A A 
Solvency Risk  A A 
II.  Investing it Efficiently 
and Wisely 
A  A 
Management Costs  A  
Investment Risk A  A 
III.  Ensure Planned 
Benefits for Life 
A  A 
Inflation Risk A   
Market Timing Risk A  A 
Longevity Risk A  A 
Overall   A 
 
D.  The Shift from Defined Benefit Plans to Defined Contribution Plans Since 
1980 
Recently, there has been a marked shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution plans in the American private sector.  Since 1980, terminated 
pension plans have overwhelmingly been defined benefit plans while new 
plans have overwhelmingly been defined contribution plans, as employers 
with defined benefit plans either went out of business or converted to defined 
contribution plans.100  As shown in Figure 4, the percentage of American 
workers covered by defined benefit plans was about 39% in 1980, but 
declined to about 14% by 2011.  As the percentage of workers covered by 
 
 100. Butrica et al., supra note 1, at 1–3; McCourt, supra note 81; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 6. 
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defined benefit plans has declined, the percentage covered by defined 
contribution plans has increased from 19% in 1980 to 42% in 2011.101 
This transition has occurred for a variety of reasons.102  With the change 
from an industrial economy to an information economy and with the decline 
of the American labor movement, American employers have organized 
production with a greater emphasis on flexible labor.103  Long-term job tenure 
has significantly declined in the private sector since the 1980s, at least for 
men.104  As a result, both employers and employees have put a greater value 
on the portability of defined contribution plans and their superior ability to 
deal with accrual risk.105 
Also, the rise of the global economy with cheap labor in Asia and the 
decline of American unions have put constant downward pressure on 
American wages and benefits since 1980.106  As a result, American 
businesses have been able to change to defined contribution plans, reducing 
pension benefits and shifting risk onto employees, and still successfully 
recruit.107  Finally, because there are fewer promises to enforce over time, the 
compliance costs of defined contribution plans under ERISA are much lower 
than for defined benefit plans.  This is attractive especially to small employers 
who cannot afford an expensive plan.108 
 
 101. See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2010.pdf (last visited May 23, 2013); U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables and Graphs at 6 Graph E5g (Nov. 2012), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historicaltables.pdf.  Categorized within the defined benefit pension 
in these figures, hybrid cash balance plans have also shown growth in popularity since the 1990s.  In 2001, 
cash balance plans constituted 2.9% of the defined benefit plans in the private sector, but by 2008 they 
constituted 11% of such plans.  Lucas, supra note 55, at 453. 
 102. BROADBENT ET AL., supra note 10, at 17–18; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. 
WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, supra note 43, at 17–26; Butrica et al., supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 103. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4, at 4. 
 104. Henry S. Farber, Employment Insecurity: The Decline in Worker-Firm Attachment in the United 
States (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/172farber.pdf. 
 105. See Butrica et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
 106. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4, at 10–12. 
 107. See Butrica et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
 108. See id. 
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Figure 4: Percent of Private Sector Workers Participating in an 
Employer Sponsored Pension Plan, by Type of Plan, 1979–2011 
 
Source:  EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2010.pdf (last visited May 23, 2013). 
 
Public sector pension plans are still overwhelmingly defined benefit 
plans.  In 2009, 84% of all state and local government employees had access 
to a defined benefit plan, while 29% had access to a defined compensation 
plan and 14% had access to both.109  However, with the decrease in state 
revenue and plan assets attendant to the Great Recession, some states have 
taken steps to move toward defined contribution plans and lower benefits.110  
In 2011, Rhode Island adopted a major overhaul of its state pension plan that 
included cuts to future benefits and a transition to a hybrid defined benefit/
defined contribution system.  Similarly, in 2012, Virginia adopted a new 
hybrid pension system.  These plans generally end or limit the future accrual 
of defined benefit payments, transitioning future and sometimes current 
employees to a less generous defined contribution plan.  In all, thirteen 
states—including Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, 
 
 109. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United 
States - March 2010 (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebnr0016.txt. 
 110. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 76, at 6. 
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Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington—have 
hybrid plans for teachers or general state workers.111 
This shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, first in the 
private sector and now beginning in the public sector, has had several 
implications for the American pension system.  First, the shift has been 
accompanied by a significant decrease in the amount of money set aside for 
retirement per worker.  Although there is no logical reason why a change to a 
defined contribution pension would necessitate a decrease in benefits or 
saving, this seems to be by far the most common experience in the American 
labor market of the global economy.112  Second, the rise of the defined 
contribution pension has decreased accrual risk and made pension benefits 
more mobile.  This is probably an important improvement in the private 
sector, where long-term job tenure has declined, but less important in the 
public sector.  Third, the rise of the defined contribution pension has 
decreased solvency risk and made monitoring solvency problems cheaper.  
However, this improvement in solvency and monitoring costs occurs because 
of the lack of group investment and annuitization features in a defined 
contribution pension, a lack that results in significant disadvantages.  Fourth, 
the transition to defined contribution plans has made our pension system 
significantly less efficient in saving and investing pension assets.  The savings 
and investment decisions of individual workers in defined contribution plans 
have proven less prudent than those made in group defined benefit plans.  
Moreover, these individual investment decisions are less efficient in 
processing investment information and rebalancing the investment portfolio 
over time.  Finally, the transition from defined benefit to defined contribution 
pensions has placed more risk on employees, both in the form of investment 
risk and longevity risk.  This seems to be a most unfortunate development 
because large employers, and certainly the State, would appear to be superior 
risk bearers to their employees and better able to efficiently spread risk over 
employees and over time.  This development has also had consequences for 
the larger economy, as workers’ ability to retire has become pro-
cyclical⎯older workers hang on to jobs during recessions (when we might 
like them to retire) because they are waiting for the investment value of their 
defined compensation pension assets to recover. 
 
 111. NASRA ISSUE BRIEF: STATE HYBRID RETIREMENT PLANS, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT 
ADMINS. (November 2011), available at http://www.nasra.org/resources/HybridBrief.pdf; PEW CENTER ON 
THE STATES, supra note 2, at 8; Ron Snell, Checklist of State Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution and 
Hybrid Plans for State Employees and Teachers, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,(August 
2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/checklist-of-db-dc-hybrid-plans.aspx. 
 112. The Trouble with Pensions: Falling Short, ECONOMIST, June 12, 2008, at 89. 
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E.  Dealing with the Pension Funding “Crisis” in the Wake of the Great 
Recession 
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, the Great Recession has 
exacerbated some of the funding problems in the American pension system, 
not only because of the enormous diminution in value of plan assets caused by 
the stock market crash, but also because the reduced economic activity has led 
to reduced corporate and government revenue, which has undermined 
employers’ ability and willingness to make promised pension 
contributions.113 
In the private sector, ERISA and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
require full funding of all pension liability and the amortization of any 
funding shortfalls within a fairly limited number of years.114  However, due to 
unexpected funding obstacles caused by the stock market crash and the 
intentional lowering of interest rates to stimulate economic growth, Congress 
granted private employers temporary relief from full funding requirements 
under federal law in the Pension Relief Act of 2010.115  In 2011, the average 
asset-to-liability ratio for private employer defined benefit pensions was about 
79%.116 
In the public sector, the Government Accounting Standards Board 
(“GASB”) standard for a “well-funded pension” is an asset-to-liability ratio of 
at least 80%.117  Although the average asset-to-liability ratio for state defined 
benefit pensions was 103% as recently as 2001,118 by 2011 the average asset-
to-liability ratio for state defined benefit pensions had declined to 75%.119  Of 
course, there has been some variation among the states as to their 
 
 113. See Private Pensions: Long-Standing Challenges Remain for Multiemployer Pension Plans: 
Hearing Before S.Com. Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (statement of Charles A. 
Jesezck, Acting Dir., Gov’t Accountability Office, Educ., Workforce, and Income Sec. Issues Div.); PEW 
CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 1; Allen, supra note 73, at 450–53; Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten 
Employee Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer Benefit Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77 
(2011). 
 114. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified at scattered  
sections of Titles 26 and 29 of the U.S.C.). 
 115. See Pub. L. No. 111-192, 124 Stat. 1280 (2010). 
 116. Ehrhardt, supra note 75. 
 117. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 2. 
 118. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 76, at 2.  In 2000, more than half of the states were fully funded—
now only Wisconsin and the District of Columbia can claim that status.  PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra 
note 2, at 2. 
 119. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 76, at 1.  The further advance of the stock market will of course help 
this problem.  Munnell estimates that, without any changes, the average asset-to-liability ratio for state funds 
will rise to 82% by 2015.  Id. at 5.  In the literature there is currently a debate over the appropriate discount 
rate to use in reporting state pension funding ratios.  Historically, the GASB has used an estimate based on 
the expected earnings of the fund assets.  MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 76, at 2 (2012); PEW CENTER ON THE 
STATES, supra note 1, at 8.  More recently, some have argued for the adoption of a zero risk interest rate 
based on the certainty of the state paying the benefits.  ANDREW G. BIGGS, STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS, 
PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS: HOW WELL FUNDED ARE THEY REALLY?, 2, 5,–7 (2012), available at http://
www.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/20120716_PensionFinancingUpdate.pdf.  Here, I report funding ratios 
according to the GASB standards used by the state pensions. 
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responsibility in meeting their funding obligations.  The best-funded 
jurisdictions in 2011 were the District of Columbia (111%), Wisconsin 
(100%), North Carolina (99%), Delaware (96%), South Dakota (96%), 
Washington (92%), New York (90%), and Tennessee (90%).120  The worst-
funded states in 2011 were Arkansas (61%), New Hampshire (58%), West 
Virginia (57%), Kentucky (57%), Louisiana (56%), Illinois (54%), Oklahoma 
(54%), and Connecticut (53%).121  In all, thirty-three states did not meet the 
80% funding guideline of the GASB in 2011.122 
In order to address funding shortfalls in the wake of the Great Recession, 
nearly every state has made some adjustments to its state or local pension 
plans by either reducing benefits or increasing employee contributions.123  As 
shown in Figure 5, the states have responded to their pension plan funding 
shortfalls in four basic ways, all of which either decrease future benefits or 
increase employee contributions.  From 2008 to 2012, thirty-one states 
enacted legislation that decreased benefits for future employees.124  These 
benefit decreases usually took the form of (1) raising the age at which those 
employees could retire with full benefits or (2) making the pension benefit 
formula less generous.125  Retroactive benefit decreases for current employees 
or retirees would raise contractual and constitutional issues.126  During this 
same period, twenty-five states increased employee pension contributions, 
although five of them did so only on new employees.127  Twelve states have 
modified the cost-of-living increases for current and future retirees, with some 
states linking future increases to the funded status of the plan or to returns on 
 
 120. Biggs, supra note 119, at 23–24. 
 121. See id. 
 122. The remaining 35 states in the middle were: Florida (87%), Georgia (86%), Oregon (86%), 
Wyoming (85%), Texas (84%), Nebraska (82%), Utah (82%), Iowa (81%), California (80%), Virginia (80%), 
Idaho (79%), Minnesota (79%), Michigan (78%), Pennsylvania (78%), Missouri (77%), Arizona (76%), 
Arkansas (74%), Massachusetts (73%), Maine (73%), Vermont (73%), New Mexico (72%), North Dakota 
(71%), Alabama (70%), Montana (70%), Nevada (70%), Colorado (69%), Hawaii (69%), South Dakota 
(69%), Ohio (67%), Kansas (64%), Maryland (64%), Mississippi (64%), Rhode Island (64%), Indiana (63%), 
and New Jersey (62%).  See id. 
 123. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, between 2008 and 2011, forty-four 
states enacted benefit cuts, increased employee contributions, or did both.  RONALD K. SNELL, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT PLAN ENACTMENTS IN 2008 STATE 
LEGISLATURES 2 (2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/pensions-and-retirement-
plan-enactments-2008.aspx; RON SNELL, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE PENSION 
REFORM, 2009-2011, 1 (2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-pension-reform-
2009-to-2011.aspx [hereinafter STATE PENSION REFORM}.  The only exceptions appear to be Alaska, Oregon, 
Idaho, Ohio, Tennessee, and South Carolina. 
 124. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 76, at 6. 
 125. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 2, at 8. 
 126. Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alteration of Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements and 
the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege: 
Does State Law Facilitate or Block Recent Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public Servants?, 27 ABA J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 179, 180 (2012); Eric M. Maider, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for 
Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution (forthcoming draft on file with 
author). 
 127. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 76, at 6. 
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fund assets.128  Finally, during this period, five states, including Georgia, 
Michigan, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia, switched from a defined benefit 
plan to some form of hybrid plan.129  A total of thirteen states now have 
hybrid plans for teachers or general state employees, although these plans are 
usually a partial defined benefit and defined contribution plan rather than a 
cash balance plan.130  Nine states and the District of Columbia now have 
defined contribution plans as the primary retirement plan for their teachers or 
general state workers.131 
Among the states enacting the most sweeping changes were Rhode 
Island and Virginia.  The Rhode Island bill cuts benefits for current and future 
employees in an effort to trim $3 billion from the State’s unfunded liability.  
Under the plan, state pensions will be supplemented by savings in newly 
created IRAs, to which both the employee and the State will contribute.  
Virginia lawmakers also approved a hybrid approach in March of 2012, but 
for the most part, it will impact only future hires, not current employees.132 
 
 128. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington.  PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 2, at 8; 
SNELL, STATE PENSION REFORM, supra note 123, at 2. 
 129. RONALD K. SNELL, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION AND 
HYBRID RETIREMENT PLANS 9–11 (2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-
defined-contribution-hybrid-retirement-plans.aspx. 
 130. Kansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska have cash balance plans, while Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Utah, and Washington have another form of hybrid plan.  
Id. at 2. 
 131. These jurisdictions are Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Michigan, Montana, 
North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, and Utah.  A number of states have defined contribution plans for 
smaller groups of employees such as administrators and state legislators.  Id. 
 132. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 2, at 8. 
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Figure 5: Number of States Making Changes to State or Local Pensions 
in the Wake of the Great Recession: 2008–2012 
 
Sources: ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., THE FUNDING OF STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: 2011-2015 at 4 (Ctr. for 
Ret. Res. at Bos. Coll. Report ed., May 2012), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/
slp_24.pdf; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE WIDENING GAP: THE GREAT RECESSION’S IMPACT ON STATE 
PENSION AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE COSTS 2 (April 2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State_policy/State_Pensions_Health_Care_Retiree_Benefits.pdf; 
Pew Center on the States, The Widening Gap Update at 2 (June 2012), available at http://
www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Pensions_Update.pdf. 
F.  Proposals for the Future: How to Best Ensure the Payment of Adequate 
Pension Benefits 
As my analysis has shown, neither defined benefit nor defined 
contribution pensions strictly dominate the other in terms of dealing with the 
problems in designing an optimal pension plan.  Both have advantages and 
disadvantages.  Traditional defined benefit plans enjoy enormous efficiencies 
over defined contribution plans in the investment and annuitization of their 
benefits due to the group nature of their plan.  Defined benefit plans also have 
the advantage of putting more risk on the employer, which, at least in the case 
of large employers and the State, is the superior risk bearer.  Defined 
contribution plans enjoy substantial advantages over defined benefit plans in 
dealing with accrual risk and solvency risk, due to the individual account and 
current payment aspects of these plans.  In no small part, these advantages 
have driven the movement away from defined benefit plans and towards 
defined contribution plans in the current, much more mobile, American labor 
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market.  The obvious solution is to try to append the group investment and 
annuitization features of defined benefit plans onto defined contribution plans 
and append the individual account and current payment features of defined 
contribution plans onto defined benefit plans—in other words, move toward a 
hybrid pension system.  This can be done through either modest or more 
radical proposals. 
The modest proposals one might make would seem fairly non-
controversial.  For defined benefit pensions, we might try to encourage multi-
employer pensions to allow greater employee mobility at reduced accrual risk.  
ERISA could be amended to allow non-union employers to join Taft-Hartley 
plans and to remove other obstacles to multi-employer plans.  Modest tax 
advantages could also be given for multi-employer plans and for insurance 
companies to develop simplified low-cost multi-employer defined benefit 
plans for small businesses.  Addressing the problem of back-loading within 
the context of a defined benefit pension would require regulation of the 
benefit formula and disqualifying plans that included too much back-loading.  
But even this might not be too controversial because employees are clearly 
averse to the accrual risk of the modern labor market. 
For defined contribution plans, we might try to take advantage of more 
efficient group investment by encouraging better investment options and 
better investment defaults in defined contribution plans.  Pension plan 
participants are remarkably affected by the initial default decisions of their 
plans.  Thus, we could go a long way toward improving the efficiency of 
defined contribution plan investment by simply encouraging or requiring a 
default to a good mutual fund that is age-indexed to the employee’s expected 
retirement date.133  Requiring a default that the employee fully participates in 
the pension plan, unless he expressly opts out, would also help ameliorate the 
problem of disappointing participation in defined contribution plans.134  To 
bring the advantages of group annuitization to defined contribution plans 
would require more intrusive regulation encouraging that all or a portion of 
the employee’s account assets be pre-committed to annuitization at the time 
they are earned so as to avoid the adverse selection bias that plagues 
individual annuitization.  Perhaps the simplest “modest solution” is for 
Congress to give tax incentives to businesses that adopt a full hybrid cash 
balance plan. 
 
 133. Monahan, supra note 13; Dana M. Muir, Default Settings in Defined Contribution Plans: A 
Comparative Approach to Fiduciary Obligation and the Role of Markets, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 59 
(2012). 
 134. Some commentators have proposed the idea of an “automatic 401(k)” that employees are enrolled 
in, unless they opt out.  Jonathan Gruber et al., Improving Opportunities and Incentives for Saving by Middle- 
and Low-Income Households, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/
papers/200604hamilton_2_pb.pdf. 
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More ambitious proposals, however, may also be in order.  It should be 
noted that participants in both defined benefit plans and defined contribution 
plans could benefit from the development of new pension and annuity 
products and markets.  I have already mentioned that insurance companies 
could be encouraged to develop and market multi-employer defined benefit 
plans to small employers.  Borrowing a page from the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”),135 investment firms and insurance 
companies could be encouraged or required to develop “Affordable Pension 
Exchanges” for the purchase of group investment services by small businesses 
or individuals with defined contribution plans.136  The adverse selection and 
efficiency problems of individuals and small businesses in purchasing health 
insurance are in many ways analogous to their problems in purchasing 
pension services.  By requiring a certain amount of participation in annuities 
and reforming the market to develop new products and providers, perhaps 
government regulation can improve market efficiency. 
In order to address the solvency problems of state defined benefit plans, 
we might make them subject to the same funding and insurance requirements 
as private sector defined benefit plans under ERISA and the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006.137  Although a few states seem to have trouble 
making promised pension contributions, most states performed as well as the 
private ERISA plans during the unusually poor economic period of the Great 
Recession.  Finally, if Congress became very serious about reform, it might 
deny tax benefits to all private pensions except those that were set up on the 
basis of a cash balance plan.  Nevertheless, we can almost certainly make 
significant progress in reform without resort to such drastic measures. 
The funding problems caused by the Great Recession have served as a 
wake-up call for policy-makers to reconsider our pension system.  Pensions 
are an important part of our national policy to encourage saving for 
retirement, and there is plenty of room to improve the performance of both 
defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans in our system of pension 
regulation.138  There is need to reform by bringing portability and solvency to 
defined pension plans and the efficiency of group investment and 
annuitization to defined contribution plans.  Both of these objectives can be 
achieved by encouraging the adoption of hybrid cash balance plans.  Although 
there is no need to panic, as a middle-aged man I can tell you it is never too 
early to begin thinking about retirement. 
 
 135. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 136. Monahan, supra note 13; Glossary: Affordable Insurance Exchanges, HEALTHCARE.GOV (2011), 
http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/a/affordable-insurance-exchange.html. 
 137. Allen, supra note 73, at 479–80. 
 138. Secunda, supra note 97 (general call for study and reform). 
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Table 2A: Illinois State Pensions—Causes of the $79.5 Billion Unfunded 
Liability, FY 1983–2011 
 1983–2007 2008–2011 Total 1983–2011 
 
Billions 
of 
Dollars 
Percent 
of Total 
Billions 
of 
Dollars 
Percent 
of Total 
Billions 
of 
Dollars 
Percent 
of Total 
Employer 
Contribution 
Shortfall 
21.74 27.35% 12.43 15.63% 34.17 42.98% 
Investment Returns 
Higher/Lower 
-2.05 -2.58% 20.80 26.17% 18.75 23.59% 
Miscellaneous 9.67 12.17% 3.18 4.00% 12.86 16.17% 
Benefit Increases 8.17 10.28% 0.01 0.01% 8.18 10.29% 
Changes in Actuarial 
Assumptions 
-2.11 -2.65% 5.79 7.28% 3.68 4.63% 
Salary Increases 
Larger/Smaller 
3.17 3.98% -1.31 -1.65% 1.85 2.33% 
Total 38.59 48.54% 40.90 51.45% 79.49 100.00% 
Source:  Eric M. Madiar et al., Thoughts on Illinois’ Public Pension Crisis, 28th Annual Illinois Public 
Sector Labor Relations Law Conference, Chicago-Kent College of Law (Nov. 30, 2012) (copy on file with 
the author). 
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Table 3A: Percent of Private-Sector Workers Participating in an 
Employment-Based Retirement Plan, by Plan Type, 1979–2011* 
 Defined 
Benefit 
Only 
Defined 
Contrib. 
Only 
Both 
DB & 
DC 
Defined 
Benefit 
Total 
Defined 
Contrib. 
Total 
Either 
Total 
1979 28 7 10 38 17 45 
1980 28 8 11 39 19 47 
1981 27 9 11 38 20 47 
1982 23 10 13 36 23 46 
1983 21 11 15 36 26 47 
1984 19 11 16 35 27 46 
1985 17 13 16 33 29 46 
1986 17 14 15 32 29 46 
1987 17 15 14 31 29 46 
1988 16 15 14 30 29 45 
1989 15 16 14 29 30 45 
1990 13 17 15 28 32 45 
1991 13 18 14 27 32 45 
1992 12 20 14 26 34 46 
1993 11 20 15 26 35 46 
1994 10 21 14 24 35 45 
1995 9 23 14 23 37 46 
1996 8 23 15 23 38 46 
1997 6 25 15 21 40 46 
1998 7 27 15 22 42 49 
1999 7 29 14 21 43 50 
2000 7 30 13 20 43 50 
2001 7 30 13 20 43 50 
2002 6 30 13 19 43 50 
2003 6 30 13 19 43 49 
2004 5 31 13 18 44 49 
2005 5 31 12 17 43 48 
2006 4 31 12 16 43 47 
2007 3 32 12 15 44 47 
2008 3 31 12 15 43 46 
2009 3 30 12 15 42 45 
2010 3 31 11 14 42 45 
2011 3 31 11 14 42 45 
Source: EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2010.pdf (last visited May 23, 2013).
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Table 4A: State Pension Funding Ratios and Unfunded Liabilities, 
GASB Accounting, 2011 Estimate 
State 
Asset/Liability 
Funding Ratio 
Unfunded 
Liability 
($Millions) State 
Asset/Liability 
Funding Ratio 
Unfunded 
Liability 
($Millions) 
AK 61% 6,150 MT 70% 3,590 
AL 70% 16,167 NC 99% 4,055 
AR 74% 6,584 ND 71% 1,657 
AZ 76% 13,268 NE 82% 1,757 
CA 80% 107,291 NH 58% 3,980 
CO 69% 27,224 NJ 62% 42,524 
CT 53% 23,007 NM 72% 10,866 
DC 111% (309) NV 70% 10,797 
DE 96% 447 NY 90% 51,716 
FL 87% 19,251 OH 67% 68,048 
GA 86% 14,862 OK 54% 9,021 
HI 69% 7,918 OR 86% 13,135 
IA 81% 5,524 PA 78% 41,169 
ID 79% 1,071 RI 64% 8,983 
IL 54% 95,110 SC 69% 15,906 
IN 63% 13,653 SD 96% 264 
KS 64% 9,520 TN 90% 2,983 
KY 57% 24,341 TX 84% 35,840 
LA 56% 17,167 UT 82% 4,776 
MA 73% 23,403 VA 80% 23,862 
MD 64% 18,170 VT 73% 1,150 
ME 73% 2,240 WA 92% 3,008 
MI 78% 33,047 WI 100% 126 
MN 79% 11,644 WV 57% 4,771 
MO 77% 10,511 WY 85% 1,295 
MS 64% 12,446    
Source: ANDREW G. BIGGS, PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS: HOW WELL FUNDED ARE THEY REALLY? (2012), 
available at http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/20120716_PensionFinancingUpdate.pdf. 
